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Abstract 
 
Party activists are assets to the political party. Their contributions to the party in terms of time, 
money and energy are undeniable. They are the strongest supporters of the parties and 
candidates during elections, very loyal and dedicated to the party and research shows that the 
more active members a party has in a constituency, the more votes it will win there. This paper 
explores the factors that drive individuals to become political party activists of a newly established 
party, Parti Amanah Negara – Amanah (National Trust Party). Then it is followed by a discussion 
on why do they leave the party (Parti Islam seMalaysia – PAS) they once became very active. 
The discussions are mainly guided by the General Incentive theory that suggests seven 
incentives that motivate individuals to become party activists. The last part briefly analyses the 
future and prospects of Parti Amanah Negara in the next 14th General Election, specifically in 
Terengganu, the PAS stronghold state. The respondents reveal that ideological differences 
between them and the former party are too great and they are more skeptical about the value of 
political engagement through PAS. This study also opposes the existing literature that the 
tendency for ideologically-extreme activists to leave the party is lower compared to the moderate 
activists since all the respondents were former active PAS activists in Terengganu and had been 
with party for years. 
 
Keywords: Party Amanah Negara, Parti Islam seMalaysia, General Incentives model 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ultimate goal of political parties in democratic world is to gain political office through 
elections. Their other objectives may be broader than just winning election, but electoral success 
is always the central objective. In order to secure the votes and maintain people supports for the 
political parties in the elections, and make them understand and approve party policies and 
leadership, a strong team consisting of loyal, committed and faithful party members is necessary 
to give the parties life, shape and permanence (Blake, Carty, & Erickson, 1991; Layman, Carsey, 
Green, Herrera, & Cooperman, 2010). This group of party members is known as political party 
activists that aims to see their desired candidate or party gets support, remains relevant and 
acceptable, wins the elections and forms the government (Milliar, 2012; Clark, Khan, & 
McLaverty, 2002; Vergani, 2014). Political party activists are unique people. They are unusual 
people because they voluntarily become active in a costly activity and take vigorous actions in 
politics (McLean & McMillan, 2003) like coordinating various party programs, attentively 
attending meetings and other party programs and making sure the party remains relevance. 
Majority citizens, on the other hands, choose to free – ride rather than getting involved with 
political and party affairs, as the benefits are already reaped without being political party activists. 
Not surprisingly, political party activism attracts only relatively small numbers of individual 
(Whiteley, Seyd, & Richardson, 1994). Scholars have been bewildered by the motives behind 
their decisions to be active participants in political parties. They have to be incentivized, proposed 
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(Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). They then formulated seven cost-benefits and value-norms incentives 
that motivate political party activism that is called the General Incentives Model. 
 
Unfortunately, many political parties faced a significant decline in membership and grassroots 
party activism (Biezen & Poguntke, 2014; Mjelde, 2015; Ponce & Scarrow, 2014; Ingrid, Mair, & 
Poguntke, 2012). It is worrying phenomenon since activists and members are the central spines 
to the political parties, hence, this absence of a voluntary dimension to party activity has directly 
weakened the performance of political parties and their organizational capacity and threatened 
the future of democracy. Studies reported that the main reason for party activists to leave the 
party is the ideological differences between them and their party were too great (Dassonneville, 
Blais, & Dejaeghere, 2015; Wagner, 2016). There is a tendency for more moderate members to 
leave the party when they feel the party is loosening its ideological stance compared to more 
ideologically extreme activists. The altruistic - based activists leave the party when they think that 
they have little influence on the party line, and their involvement in political parties do not give 
any impact on society. The ideology promoted by the party is not well-translated into action, thus, 
keeping them away from that political party. They are more skeptical about the value of political 
engagement through parties they once joined.  
 
2. From PAS to Amanah 
 
This study throws light on the factors that lead someone to become committed political party 
activist while others refuse to do so and the factors they decide to leave the party they once 
became very active. Attention is given to the former activists of Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS) in 
Terengganu, a PAS stronghold state in the northeast of Malaysia. The first part of this paper 
focuses on the factors they chose to be political party activists, followed by the factors that led 
them to leave PAS and join a new party, Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). Lastly, this paper 
concludes with a discussion on the future and prospects of Amanah in Terengganu and how its 
emergence may affect PAS’ performance in Terengganu.  
 
Historically, the organizational conflicts that lead to splintering and factionalism in PAS previously 
befell due to the differences in their political approaches and strategies. It is not peculiar when 
PAS top leaders and committed members left the party to form a new party as a result of internal 
fractions and dissatisfaction. The 1960’s three-cornered leadership crisis of PAS in Terengganu 
and the internal clash between the “Old Guard” led by PAS President, Asri Muda against the 
“Young Turks” of the ABIM prominent figures such as Abdul Hadi Awang, Fadzil Muhammad 
Noor and Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat are two crises worth mentioning. Asri Muda, for instance, left 
PAS in 1983 to form HAMIM. Others left and formed Parti Islah Malaysia and Angkatan Keadilan 
Insan Malaysia (Wan Saiful, 2017). Whether these splinter parties survived or otherwise is 
another story. With the fading influence of the Old Guards, the Young Turks in PAS were pushing 
for more extensive and intensive Islamization process in the country. They relied on the issue of 
establishing an Islamic state to rival UMNO’s nationalistic and secular ideology. PAS’s success 
in wresting back Kelantan in 1990 was generalized as Malay-Muslim acceptance of PAS’ Islamic 
state. However, the general election results in the 80s and 90s indicated the extremely weak 
support of the non-Malays for PAS. PAS understood the message and demonstrated its 
readiness to compromise its Islamic state and Hudud principles. 
 
The combination of ulama and professional has shown the wave tolerance within party. Ulama 
faction generally adheres to a conservative interpretation of how Islam should be applied to public 
policy. They also hold an exclusivist view when it comes to dealing with non-Muslims, believing 
that major policy decisions affecting Islam must be mainly in the hands of Muslims. The 
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progressive faction in PAS, on the other hand, are commonly called the professionals, implying 
that they come from professional backgrounds as opposed to the usually traditionally educated 
ulamas (Wan Saiful, 2017). PAS’ commitment to uphold democracy and support reform 
movement could be seen through its association with other opposition parties and NGOs, whose 
members are multi-ethnics. Moreover, this development brought the new approaches in dealing 
with the sensitive issues regarding the relationship between Muslim and Non-Muslim (Kasim & 
Ahmad, 2002). PAS then joined a tripartite alliance known as Pakatan Rakyat (PR), headed by 
Anwar Ibrahim. PR, comprises of Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti KeAdilan Rakyat 
(PKR), relentlessly tried to impose viable alternative vis a vis the ruling government of Barisan 
Nasional (BN) in the next general election. PAS, now holding 23 parliamentary seats, the least 
number of seats in PR, understandably occupies the lowest rung of the political power hierarchy 
within the alliance. This status quo does not go down well with PAS members who believe that 
the party commands no influence at all within PR. This development has given birth to ‘the 
reformist Erdogan faction that had managed to reinvent the party to such an extent that it was 
able to join the Pakatan Rakyat coalition and present itself to the wider Malaysian electorate 
(including non-Muslims) as a viable alternative to the UMNO-led BN coalition’ (Farish, 2014). For 
ulama camp, remaining in PR dominated by multi-ethnic DAP and PKR means that PAS runs 
the risk of giving up its fundamental vision of state and society based on Syariah (Islamic law) 
that the party has long been championing (Hamayotsu, 2010). 
 
Behind the veil, this development has sparked the internal conflict between the reformists and 
the conservative ulama camp (Farish, 2014). The absence of diplomatic approaches in handling 
the conflict has worsened the psyche war between the two camps. Later, the en masse rejection 
from the PAS members during its 61st muktamar (general meeting) in 2015 was the turning point 
that saw the progressive group within the party stray to the new path. All the PAS stalwarts from 
this progressive group lost their positions in the party and have then left PAS including Mohamad 
Sabu, Salahuddin Ayub, Dzulkefly Ahmad and Khalid Samad. Started with the movement called 
Gerakan Harapan Baru formed in Johor, this group drifted to form Parti Amanah Negara or 
Amanah. Amanah was officially launched on 16th September 2015 with former PAS deputy 
president, Mohamad Sabu was appointed as a President and other high ranks leaderships was 
held by the former leaders of PAS mixed with the top figures from NGO IKRAM (Pertubuhan 
IKRAM Malaysia) and ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia). 
 
Over the years, the competition over Islamization process in Malaysia is between PAS and 
UMNO. Now, PAS suddenly has a new competitor who is also staking a claim on the right to 
define and shape the discourse on political Islam in the country (Wan Saiful, 2017). Amanah 
promotes the motto of ‘Amanah, Progresif, Peduli’ (Trustworthy, Progressive, Caring) with the 
hope ‘to redefine the Islamic movement to a newer, bigger framework that fits the national 
agenda, and sees the movement as a continuation of what was left by the Prophet Muhammad’ 
(Mujahid, 2015).  It tries to posit itself as a progressive and inclusive Islamist party and offer itself 
as an alternative to PAS, whose discourses are dogmatic and exclusive. It tries to persuade the 
middle – class urban voters to view the party as a new platform for future Malaysia that would 
not marginalise and discriminate any segment of Malaysian society. The party allows full and 
equal membership to all Malaysians above the age of 17, regardless of race or religion. 
 
3. Parti Amanah Negara in Terengganu: The Prospects 
The politics in Terengganu is dominated by two Malay political parties; UMNO and PAS. The 
arena of political contestation and politicization in Terengganu is highly critical, causing the high-
intensity political activism among the party activists from both parties. Both parties are blessed 
with highly committed and faithful party activists. For record, PAS ruled the state twice (1959 and 
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1999), and the rest of elections are won by UMNO. Yet, PAS domination and influence cannot 
be underestimated as PAS denied UMNO’s two-third majority in the 2008 and 2013 elections. 
Other than UMNO – PAS contestation, the other parties generally did not garner enough attention 
from the voters. Splinter parties like Parti Negara led by Onn Jaafar and Semangat46 led by 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah did not last longer in Terengganu even though they had won few 
seats. PSRM (Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia) was noticeable in urban areas but never won any 
seats in this north eastern peninsular state. PAS’ splinter parties, HAMIM (Parti Hizbul Muslimin 
Malaysia) and BERJASA (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia) formed by two former Chief 
Ministers of Kelantan due to party’s internal conflicts were in action form one term only.  
 
Reading the fates of splinter parties and small parties in Terengganu based on historical records, 
would Amanah Terengganu receive the same fate? Contesting in a PAS stronghold state would 
be tough for Amanah, as it is not financially well resourced and having small base of grassroots 
activists. However, the entrance of PAS leading figures in Terengganu to Amanah including Raja 
Bahrin Shah (Kuala Terengganu Member of Parliament), Dr. Sulaiman Abdullah (former PAS 
Assemblyman of Ladang), Ustaz Roslan Ismail (former PAS Assemblyman of Bukit Besi), Ustaz 
Aziz Abas (former PAS Assemblyman of Jerteh), Ustaz Rozali Mohamad (former PAS 
Assemblyman of Permaisuri), Syed Azman Syed Nawawi (Batu Buruk Assemblyman) and 
Hasbie Muda (former PAS Youth Central Committee) should not be underrated by PAS.  
Huat (2015) analyses the future of Amanah in Malaysian politics and concludes that Amanah can 
survive based on protest votes. He brought two situations, where PAS benefited protest votes in 
the 1990 and 1999 elections. In the 1990, the UMNO internal crisis between team Mahathir and 
team Tengku Razaleigh had weakened UMNO and given advantage to PAS until it won Kelantan. 
In the 1999 election, PAS won Terengganu due to voters’ rejection against the six-term Chief 
Minister, Wan Mokhtar Wan Ahmad, who had held the position since 1974. In addition, Anwar 
Ibrahim’s dismissal also affects the victory of PAS. PAS did not win solely due to its own strength 
and strong support base, but also due to protest votes by the voters who were disappointed with 
the incumbent party. Huat (2015) then suggests that Amanah should learn from the failures of 
new and small parties like Parti Negara in 1959, Parti Semangat46 in 1995 and Parti Keadilan 
Nasional in 1999 elections. These parties received promising popular votes but they lost due to 
scattered seats they contested. They contested in many constituencies without having strong 
base and strong groundwork. They were popular in certain areas but not in other areas. Parti 
Keadilan learnt from its 1999 mistakes by focusing on mixed constituencies. As a result, they 
received unprecedented victory in the 2008 election. Similar to Amanah Terengganu, focus and 
strategy should be on specific constituencies like urban areas that could accept its ideology. 
Amanah might loss its election deposits in rural areas in under Parliament Besut, Hulu 
Terengganu and Setiu. Contesting in all state seats also is not a right decision since they may 
lose focus. Fielding winnable candidates, offering practical promises that can ease voters’ 
burdens and not over – depending on lame issues like IMDB and its 2.6 billion scandal are 
amongst the formula that should be applied.    
Amanah’s close relationship with DAP also has tarnished its Islamic image in the eyes of 
conservative voters in Terengganu. Amanah’s stands on several religious and moral issues like 
rejecting Hadi’s Syariah bill, reluctant responses on rights of non – Muslims and non – Malays 
on open festival of beer drinking, criticizing the failure of Tahfiz schools to observe fire safety and 
mingling around with liberals supporting LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) like Siti 
Kassim and SIS (Sister in Islam) during women’s demonstration on toxic politics have been 
questioned by Malay voters. They are being cynical over Amanah’s motto – Rahmatan lil Alamin 
(Mercy to All). 
4. Theoretical Approach: The General Incentives model 
The general incentives model of political participation refers to the individual’s motivation to 
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participate in political activities beyond a narrowly cast economic analysis of incentives and 
resources (Baras, Correa, & Rodriguez, 2013; Milliar, 2012; Haute & Gauja, 2015; Whiteley & 
Seyd, 2002). It is a comprehensive model as it adds the elements of affective motives, moral 
concerns, and social norms that have not been touched by other political participation models 
like the Rational Choice model and the Civic Voluntarism model. Prominent party membership 
researchers, Whiteley & Seyd, (2002) propose seven incentives that motivate individuals to 
involve actively in political parties.  
The first incentive is selective process incentive. It is the psychological satisfaction derived from 
the process of participation itself. The entertainment values of being involved in political activities 
like an opportunity to meet like - minded people, participate in various political activities, learn 
about the political process at first hand and receive better political information. They join for the 
benefits of group distinction and the status resulting from membership. The second one is 
selective outcome incentives. They are the positive results of being party activists in the 
materialistic form such as gaining politically appointed positions in the executive and legislative 
branches, developing a full-time career in party politics and getting government projects or 
contracts (Weldon, 2006; Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). In order to survive, Farouk, (2011) suggests 
that parties must from the very beginning distribute material incentives such as prestigious 
positions and projects or contracts to some of its members to tie them up. However, he reminds 
enticing the activists with material returns will weaken the credibility of the party as an 
organization dedicated to a public good and therefore adversely affect its distribution of collective 
incentives. 
The next incentive is collective incentive. Party activists believe and identify themselves with 
political ideas convicted by political parties. They have a greater incentive to be active if their 
party is pursuing policies which closely congruence with their own policy preferences. Collective 
incentives to be active in a political party are twofold: positive and negative. Activists will 
participate not only because they want to promote particular policy goals but also because they 
oppose the policy goals of other parties (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). Collective incentives are always 
equated with ideological incentives. The ideology, manifestoes and directions of the party are 
the factors party activists feel motivated to be active compared to those who attach a lower 
priority to the party policies. The normative incentives are directed at compliance with social 
norms and the perceived opinions of significant people whose opinions they respect and value. 
Some party activists receive a pressure that forces them to win the respect or approval from their 
circles like it is a family tradition to become activists, influence by educational institution, religious 
institution and peers (Back, Teorell, & Westholm, 2011; Cross & Young, 2008). It is also about 
the public perception of the status and image of the party and its activists. They also choose to 
be politically active because they feel they ought to be, since party activism is normal and it 
provides them with an opportunity to express their values and loyalties to the social norms 
(Gallagher, Liston, Marsh, & Weeks, 2002). 
Individuals are also motivated by altruistic incentives where they have an emotional attachment 
to the party which has little to do with the policy positions which it espouses, and they contribute 
without considering the costs and benefits of their actions (Young & Cross, 2002). They defend 
the perceived civic duties like fight for the interests, rights, and identities of others, offer aids to 
asylum seekers, political refugees, immigrant workers, peoples whose human rights are being 
infringed, victims of racist acts or sentiments, and populations of Third World countries and never 
serve their own interests (Passy, 2001). Altruistic concerns are expressed in terms of idealistic 
goals, such as the desire to create a more compassionate and tolerance society (Young & Cross, 
2002). Political activism is also the result of the desire to support specific political ideologies of 
the party. The ‘official’ political ideas and ideologies of political parties such as nationalism, 
communism, liberal - democratic and Islam have structured one’s political understanding and 
inspired his/her path to party activism. It also frames one’s perspective through which the world 
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is understood and explained. Heywood, (2012) claims that party ideologies are commonly 
associated with particular social classes such as liberalism with the middle classes, conservatism 
with the landlord aristocracy and socialism with the working class. Finally, the expressive 
incentives have to do with publicly expressing one’s perceived psychological, ideological and 
moral values attached to the party without fear. Strong party identification allows an activist to 
publicly express their attachment to the party. They proudly wear shirts with party logo, hung 
posters at the windows, posting, sharing and re-tweeting political statements at social media and 
joining rallies. Party activism provides a way of expressing their loyalty to the party (Back et al., 
2011) and supporting party’s stand on certain values include ethnic supremacy, religion, human 
rights, economic justice, political equality or supremacy of the constitution. 
 
5. Method 
A survey was conducted on 13-14 January 2017. The questionnaire was distributed to the 
Amanah activists during its party program; “Anti-Takfiri Tour with Ustaz Wan Ji”. This tour was 
held in five different parliament constituencies in Terengganu including Besut, Setiu, Kuala 
Nerus, Dungun and Kemaman. As a newly established political party in a PAS stronghold state, 
the attendance was encouraging. Of all distributed questionnaires, 98 were returned, consisting 
of 73% of males and 21% of females. The female activists mostly came with their husbands and 
other family members, who happen to be Amanah activists as well. Majority of them claim to be 
active members of the party (80%) and 53% have been active in politics for more than five years. 
Majority voted for PAS in the last election (79.1%) and another 19.9% did not respond. However, 
it is assumed that the respondents who did not respond to this question are either voted for PAS 
as no respondent ticked for UMNO column or were yet registered voters at that time. The 
questionnaire consists of two parts; measuring respondents’ political party activism and the 
factors that motivated them to leave PAS. The data are analysed using SPSS 17.0. 
6. Results and Discussions 
The first part of the questionnaire consists of 10 questions on respondents’ motivations of 
becoming a party activist. Questions are extracted from Whiteley & Seyd, (2002) and modified 
to suit Malaysian political situation. 
6.1 Factors to Become Party Activists 
As shown in Table 1, altruistic incentives score the highest percentage (83%). Party activists are 
unique people; they are party worker, party funder and party supporter, become active in a costly 
activity and take vigorous actions in politics (McLean & McMillan, 2003). Majority citizens, on the 
other hands, choose to free – ride rather than getting involved with political and party affairs, as 
the benefits are already reaped without being political party activists. The noble desire to serve 
one’s fellow human beings and create a better nation through political parties motivates 
respondents to become party activists. They regard activism as a way to fulfil their civic duties, 
and the indescribable feeling of satisfaction pushes them to maintain their activism. When asked 
about voting and its obligation, 95.4% strongly agree that voting is compulsory and should be 
taken as serious matter. In contrast to pessimist citizens who do not trust politicians, 71% of 
respondents trust politicians as agent of change. Most of them are also very optimist that 
opposition pact is capable to become the next government (86.5%). 
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Table 1: General Incentives that Motivate Respondents to be Party Activists 
 
 
Party ideologies are also the main factor one chooses to support and work for that particular 
party, followed by collective incentives. This is congruent with the overall findings in ten 
parliamentary democracies covering 77 political parties that party activists are generally 
motivated by ideological incentives and political values hold by the parties (Haute & Gauja, 2015). 
Respondents identify themselves with political ideas and policies convicted by political parties. 
Majority of respondents (75%) rejects the controversial statement that only Malay-Muslim political 
parties can be trusted to uphold Malay supremacy and 66.2% believe that Islamic state, including 
hudud, is not suitable to be implemented in Malaysia yet as Malaysia is a multi-racial country. 
Material rewards, positions and titles do not motivate them to give unconditional support to the 
party. This could be explained that Amanah is not a ruling party, hence, there is no direct access 
to government contracts, tenders and executive positions. Moreover, respondents are former 
PAS grassroots activists, who are very well known for their financial generosity and commitment 
to the party. When they crossed over to Amanah, they brought that culture with them. They are 
willing to work for free and to contribute towards paying for party activities as and when necessary 
(Wan Saiful, 2017). Likewise, the entertainment values enjoyed by activists as a result of being 
involved in political parties and group distinction and society’s positive perception towards them 
are obviously not the main reasons that force them to be party activists. 
 
6.2 High – Intensity Participation 
 
Whiteley and Syed (2002) have introduced a concept of high-intensity and low-intensity 
participation. High-intensity participation is a participation that takes a lot of time and effort 
involving the most committed members of the party (Goodwin, Ford, & Cutts, 2012), the 
gladiators who are prepared to participate even in the highest-cost activities (Spier, 2013). The 
political activities categorized as high-intensity are contacting and communicating not only with 
fellow party members but also with other members of the community on behalf of their party, 
campaigning for their party, fund-raising, recruiting members and preparing for and running 
election campaigns, representing their party by holding office and donating money to their party 
(Seyd & Whiteley, 2002). Table 2 indicates that 81% of respondents have donated money to fund 
party activities. Higher levels of emotional (Fisher, 1999) and religious attachments (Zaki, 2003) 
to political party or candidates motivate activists to donate money. However, Pattie, Seyd, & 
Whiteley, (2003) argue that donating money is relatively a low cost, low risk and less time 
consuming form of political activism, resulting it to be the most preferable party activities. 
Table 2: Types of High-Intensity Participation 
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For the political party to stay relevant and get supports, party programs at a big or small scale 
must be held frequently. The activists coordinate and plan party programs, promote them to the 
society and ensure they achieve party’s objectives. Tamrin (training courses), weekely usrah 
(religious circle), ceramah (public talk), sports and entertainment carnivals, rallies, charity dinner 
and walkabout are among the party activities that rejuvenate party image and help maintain 
people support to the party. Party activists are backbones of the party. Their absence may cause 
the candidates or party loss elections (Nexon, 1971). Subsequently, their time, money and 
energy are the most sought after during election campaign period. Campaigning in elections 
includes putting up posters and flags (55.4%), house-to-house campaign (50.8%), uploading 
political statuses and relevant photos to social media (49.4%) and canvassing and mobilizing 
voters (44.6%). Of all respondents, 76.9% revealed that they became full-time party activists in 
the last general election. They also join demonstrations (70%) as a way to express political 
solidarity with the party. 
 
6.3 Factors of Leaving Former Party 
There are ample studies on why people become active in politics and the political activities that 
take place along with their involvement. However, the study on what drive members’ decisions 
to leave the party is very little. Wagner, (2016)’s study reveals two main reasons on why members 
leave the party they once became active. Firstly, they feel more disengaged from politics and are 
more sceptical about the value of political engagement through parties. Secondly, they are more 
likely to hold moderate ideological beliefs, probably because they feel less strongly about their 
ideological preferences. This study asks why respondents had left PAS and they were given a 
list of seven possible reasons cited from Whiteley & Seyd, (2002), from which they could select 
as many as applied. Table 3 presents the most relevant factor that motivates Amanah activists 
to switch party is due to their disagreement with PAS’ standpoint on various issues particularly 
on the idea of forming a unity government between PAS and UMNO.  
Table 3: Factors Former PAS Activists Left the Party 
 
 
The rumours over muzakarah (talks) between conservative ulama team and UMNO spread 
among PAS supporters and create tense between the two camps. PAS President, Abdul Hadi 
suggested that cooperation with UMNO would only take place under certain conditions and solely 
focus on the advancement of Muslim faith and their interests in Malaysia, and at the same time, 
allow PAS to monitor abuses of power by the regime. The President stressed that in handling 
national issues, any party is allowed to cooperate with any party (Hamayotsu, 2010; Liow, 2011). 
Hadi’s pro-UMNO decision was not welcomed by the progressive senior members and 
supporters who strongly committed to PR. Informants firmly argued that they have been 
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committed in PAS for years due to PAS’ unshaken stand to fight UMNO, which for them is full of 
corruptions, scandals, cronyism and lies, and replacing UMNO and BN (Barisan Nasional) should 
be PAS’ utmost objective. PAS decision to be lenient and close to UMNO, and leave the 
promising PR was considered as backward and frustrating decision. For them, this move simply 
prolongs the sinking UMNO’s lifeline.  
It is understood that they have made a heavy decision to leave PAS, a party they used to fully 
devote their time, money and energy to see PAS stays relevance and gets supports from 
Malaysian voters. Therefore, accusing them as failing to display wala’ (loyalty) regarding the 
party policy on hudud and kafir (allegation of infidels and away from Islam) is simply baseless 
accusations. The informants are basically having moderate view over hudud and Islamic state. 
They do not against hudud and formation of Islamic state but stress that serious focuses should 
be put on other urgent issues such as economic downturn, uncontrolled price hiking, Goods and 
Services tax (GST), rampant corruption, mismanagement of country’s resources like 1MDB and 
unemployment. Informants also mentioned that the rampant takfiri (allege others as infidel) 
culture in PAS is not suitable with their moderate stand. For them, Islam is not exclusive to PAS 
only, and PAS does not hold the key to Heaven. They idolize Erdogan’s and Ghannouchi’s 
approaches and political ideas in Turkey and Tunisia, where Islam is inclusive and contextual 
and relevant in a multi-racial, multi-ethnic country like Malaysia (Wan Saiful, 2017; Maszlee, 
2017). 
Interestingly, this study opposes Wagner's finding on the tendency to leave the party is obvious 
among the ideologically – moderate members as their faith to party ideology is incomparable to 
ideologically – extreme activists. Respondents were staunch PAS supporters and they left the 
party. As 83% of respondents are altruistic – type of activists, they left PAS because PAS did not 
bring positive change to society and did not walk the talk. They are sceptical about PAS’ ability 
to translate its party ideology and promises into action and perceive their engagement with PAS 
did not bring altruistic values. The absence of material benefits and group distinction were not 
the factors that pulling them out from their former party. Moreover, 93.8% of respondents will not 
vote for PAS in the next election. This is congruent with Dassonneville's et al., (2015) findings 
that political dissatisfaction and frustration probably motivates the voters to find another platform. 
7. Conclusion 
The factors that led the former PAS activists to leave the party they once became very active 
can be explained by two main factors. It appears that the decisions for Amanah activists to leave 
PAS are associated with their specific attitudes towards recent development in PAS and the 
nature of PAS that deviates from its initial objectives. Reversing Whiteley's & Seyd's, (2002) 
General Incentive theory, this study found respondents’ political and ideological distance from 
PAS and their disappointment and frustration with the current nature of PAS in handling socio-
economic issues have steered the respondents to choose a new platform. In the context of 
Amanah’s future in Terengganu, initial observation concludes that it would be hard for Amanah 
as a PAS splinter party to compete in PAS stronghold state. The demography and political views 
of Terengganu voters are different with their counterparts in urban constituencies like Selangor, 
Johor and Kuala Lumpur. Focuses should be on winnable seats like Kuala Terengganu and 
Dungun, and the efforts to increase the number of active grassroots activists should be doubled. 
Amanah Terengganu also should display more strict and firm stands on Malay and Islamic issues 
and prove that they are not a DAP puppet.   
Future research should increase the number of respondents as this study is only focusing on 
Amanah activists in Terengganu. Furthermore, it is suggested that a qualitative study should be 
applied to explore why these former PAS activists left the party they used to strongly affiliate 
with, as quantitative studies may not be able to deeply explore their inner feelings (Pierre, 1986). 
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